The Ontological Contradiction (from Postulates and Empty Spaces) ('14)

Though the evidence from Kant's dialectics suggest that substance, that-which-is, causality, is accidental; and furthermore, that, if substance is accidental, indigenous meaning inhering in substance is unlikely; it also then becomes true that a question arises as to the practicality of interrogating the posited null set around inherent meaning in substance, that-which-is, from the side of complete and total immersion in substance/causality; and if meaning is seen to inhere in the possible meaningless or not; or if the beyond-us which must be antecedent to all-that-is necessitates a practical cognitive withdrawal.

If substance/causality is an accident, then it is also necessarily the result of a contingency, or strictly speaking, the contingent; the non-existence of substance subsisted as a possibility. What inheres in the contingent is the possibility of non-existence; yet accidents/contingencies are, or tend to be, contained and delimited by/within discrete successions within increments of time; the possibility, within contingencies, of non-existence, conditioned by an antithetical result (existence), seems also to necessitate discretion, discrete successions in which a change occurred (non-existence into existence). But all-that-is, substance, causality, necessarily always was and will be; time creates a formal condition of indiscretion, and endless series of successions. The Ontological Contradiction built into Kant's dialectics is this- substance/causality cannot be involved in contingency, or it would cease to be what it is (self-sufficient, permanent), which is impossible; yet, if substance/causality is an accident, it must have contingency in its economy as a hinge towards involvement, in some succession somewhere.


Introductory Notes Towards a Phenomenology: The Meta-Rational

The Meta-Rational Argument

            That the being of things consists not of our notions of them, nor our ideations of them; nor do things consist of the Kantian thing-in-itself or as independent entities; rather things consist of the balancing link between the thing-in-itself and our ideations of the thing-in-itself. The balance between these two points of consciousness cannot be perceived alone; what is needed to comprehend it is a sense of the meta-rational. The meta-rational is not, like the irrational, posited against the rational; rather, it is the step beyond mere rationality, the point at which foreign elements become important to consciousness.

-         There is space between time, space between space, and space between causes.

-         This space between is, in one sense, an intuition.

-         Space Between, in this sense, is an intuition of Being.

-         Space Between cannot be named except as such; naming entails a certain confinement.

-         Space Between can possess us between thoughts.

-         Space Between may be seen as an extension of the principle “Negative Capability” beyond aesthetics.

-         Space Between, in fact, may be seen as what consciousness is between thoughts.

-         Space Between in the selfness of what is beyond us.

-         Space Between, as transcendent will, is solid being congealed in a momentary sensation.

-         The mind must divide originally because the body itself is a plurality.

-         The mind’s structure finds its mirror in the body’s plurality; but the mind’s wholeness is not self-apparent.

-         The body is plural, yet it moves together; the mind is plural and moves plurally; that is, it is capable of moving in many directions at once.

-         The mind moving the body is conscious thought; the body moving the mind is unconscious impulse (thought).

-         Plurality is the ultimate dividing thought.

Adam Fieled 2001-2013